Incident Response

Response

Incident response is a decision system under pressure. The goal is to protect the business, preserve evidence, contain the threat, restore trusted service, and convert lessons learned into stronger controls.

Containment Can Destroy Evidence

Do not isolate, rebuild, or wipe systems until the incident commander understands the evidence impact. For ransomware, active exfiltration, or destructive activity, containment may take priority, but document the decision and approval.

Triage Decision Record

triage-decision-record.yaml
yaml
incident_id: IR-2026-042
commander: <NAME>
severity: high
business_impact:
  - customer portal degraded
  - potential identity compromise
known_facts:
  - first alert time: 2026-05-26T14:20:00Z
  - affected assets: host01, vpn-gateway
  - suspected vector: stolen credentials
unknowns:
  - data access scope
  - persistence status
  - lateral movement extent
next_decisions:
  - preserve memory on host01 before isolation
  - disable suspected accounts after coordinated evidence capture
  - notify legal if regulated data access is confirmed
incident_id: IR-2026-042
commander: <NAME>
severity: high
business_impact:
  - customer portal degraded
  - potential identity compromise
known_facts:
  - first alert time: 2026-05-26T14:20:00Z
  - affected assets: host01, vpn-gateway
  - suspected vector: stolen credentials
unknowns:
  - data access scope
  - persistence status
  - lateral movement extent
next_decisions:
  - preserve memory on host01 before isolation
  - disable suspected accounts after coordinated evidence capture
  - notify legal if regulated data access is confirmed

Response Lifecycle

Prepare

Contacts, playbooks, logging, backups, tabletop practice.

Detect

Validate alert, scope assets, assign severity, open record.

Contain

Limit blast radius while preserving critical evidence.

Recover

Rebuild from trusted state and monitor for recurrence.

Improve

Close gaps, tune detections, and update playbooks.

Containment Strategy Matrix

Scenario Preferred Action Evidence Risk
Active data theftBlock egress, disable exposed credentials, preserve network logs.Low if logs are exported first.
Malware on endpointCapture volatile data, isolate host, acquire disk or EDR package.Medium if powered off too early.
Compromised identityRevoke sessions, rotate credentials, preserve sign-in and audit logs.Low if audit logs are retained.
Ransomware executionDisconnect affected network segments and protect backups.High, but business protection may dominate.

Minimum Evidence Package

  • Incident timeline with UTC timestamps and source system for each event.
  • Alert IDs, case IDs, analyst notes, and containment approvals.
  • Identity logs, endpoint triage package, network flows, DNS/proxy logs, and cloud audit records.
  • Hashes for acquired images, memory captures, exported logs, and malware samples.
  • Recovery validation: rebuilt hosts, rotated secrets, closed firewall changes, and monitoring window results.

After-Action Improvements

after-action-backlog.csv
csv
finding,owner,due_date,validation
Missing alert for impossible travel,identity-team,2026-06-15,test with approved account
No DNS logs for branch office,network-team,2026-06-30,confirm query visibility in SIEM
Backup restore runbook stale,infrastructure-team,2026-06-20,complete tabletop and restore test
Evidence storage access too broad,security-ops,2026-06-10,review ACL and audit logs
finding,owner,due_date,validation
Missing alert for impossible travel,identity-team,2026-06-15,test with approved account
No DNS logs for branch office,network-team,2026-06-30,confirm query visibility in SIEM
Backup restore runbook stale,infrastructure-team,2026-06-20,complete tabletop and restore test
Evidence storage access too broad,security-ops,2026-06-10,review ACL and audit logs