9 min read

Policy

Regulation & Spectrum Policy

Three permissions decide what a drone engagement may do: permission to fly the aircraft, permission to transmit from it, and permission to look at what it sends. Different bodies grant them against different risks, and one does not imply another. Neutralisation sits on the counter-drone page and is not re-argued here.

A Flight Authorisation Is Not a Radio Authorisation

Nothing in a flight authorisation authorises a transmitter. A permit naming an airframe, a site and a ceiling says nothing about centre frequency, power or duty cycle; it was issued against a different risk by a different body. An interference test needs the radio authorisation before it starts, and where the target is an aircraft in service the interference is a separate offence that no spectrum licence cures.

Treat "we were allowed to fly there" as an answer to a question nobody asked.

Three Authorities, Not One

A flight authorisation answers a spatial question: whether this aircraft may be airborne in this volume of air at this time. A radio authorisation answers a spectral one: whether this transmitter may put this much energy into this band, from this place, for this fraction of the time. Interception answers a question about content: whether this party may receive, keep and use traffic carried between two others.

That separation is what assessments get wrong first. A site permit establishes that you may be on the land; it says nothing about airspace, which an aviation authority administers, or spectrum, which a different one does. A range licence may give you spectrum and a shielded room without permission to launch outdoors. Two invalid tests recur: a flight with no radio authorisation, and a radio test under a flight permit that never mentioned transmitters.

The Flight Side Is an Instrument, Not a Date

Registration and remote identification, where a jurisdiction requires them, are identity obligations rather than safety features. One ties an airframe to an accountable person; the other makes the flight announce an identity, or a session identifier resolving to one, so it is attributable while it happens and afterwards. Anonymity is not something a test can rely on.

Altitude ceilings, airspace classes and geographic zones are imposed constraints, and their origin matters. A zone published by an aviation authority is a legal boundary; a geofence inside a ground station is a manufacturer's configuration that encodes part of that boundary and part commercial judgement. Both bind the operator and neither is a security boundary: a parameter edit moves the second without touching the first, which is a finding the authorisation will not have anticipated.

Responsibility splits between operator and remote pilot. The operator holds the authorisation, registration, procedures and maintenance record; the pilot conducts an individual flight and answers for how. A report naming the operator for both leaves the client unable to fix either.

Spectrum Conditions Are Conditions

A spectrum authorisation is a list of numbers, and the numbers are the permission: centre frequency and occupied bandwidth say where, permitted EIRP says how loud, duty cycle says how often, antenna gain and height say in what shape, and a site with a named licensee closes the set. None of it is advice. Operating above the stated power makes the transmission unlicensed, the same class as transmitting with no authorisation at all; there is no partial credit for holding the paper while operating outside it.

Nor does an authorisation generalise. One band says nothing about its neighbour, a fixed site says nothing about the same equipment in a vehicle, and an experimental authorisation bounded by purpose, place and duration does not widen because a transmitter would make the test easier. The question is not whether it covers the equipment but whether it covers this emission, from here, for this long.

Jamming is not the top of that scale. Wilful interference is usually prohibited as a distinct act, independent of licence, so the prohibition attaches to the effect on other users rather than to power, and no licence is written that authorises a private party into it.

Receiving Is Its Own Question

Interference, interception and decoding are three acts with three tests. Interference asks whether a transmission degraded someone else's service; interception asks whether you were entitled to receive and use the content; decoding asks what you may then do with it. A capture can pass the first and fail the second, and a decode can pass the second and fail the third.

Interception law usually turns on whether the communication was private and whether a party consented, not on whether it was encrypted. A signal any receiver in range can hear is still a communication between two other parties, and "it was in the clear" answers a question about difficulty, not permission. A site owner's permission to test on their premises is not the aircraft owner's consent to capture their telemetry, and neither covers data belonging to a third party.

Procurement Is a Control

Equipment authorisation is a precondition for selling and importing radio equipment in a number of markets, and it can be withdrawn on national-security grounds. A qualifying national-security authority makes a determination, the regulator adds equipment or a class of equipment to a published list, and listed equipment stops receiving new authorisations. The consequence lands on procurement: fleet composition becomes a compliance question that no assessment of the aircraft itself will surface.

The FCC Covered List is the worked example. A public notice dated 22 December 2025 added uncrewed aircraft systems and critical components produced in a foreign country, among them flight controllers, data links, navigation units, ground control equipment and power components, so the question is not only which airframe carries which badge but which supplier made each part inside it. The listing has been revised since, including categories exempted from it, and the scope of the current listing is not restated here.

The notices describe the restriction as applying to new authorisations rather than to equipment already deployed, so an installed fleet and a spare-parts order can sit on different sides of it.

What This Changes in a Test

Scope arrives as three documents, and the test of them is whether each names its own limits. Flight: airframe, volume, ceiling, times. Radio: bands, power, duty cycle, antenna, site, and whose licence the test operates under. Data: which links may be captured, what is retained, for how long, and who consented.

engagement-authorisation.yaml
# An authorisation record that keeps the three questions separate.
# One entry per authority. A transmitting test needs all three.

flight:
  authority: aviation-permission      # certificate, waiver or site permission
  holder: uas-operator
  aircraft: [serial, registration, broadcast-identifier]
  limits: [site, radius, ceiling, window]

radio:
  authority: spectrum-licence         # or the range operator's own licence
  holder: licensee
  emission: [centre-frequency, bandwidth]
  limits: [max-eirp, duty-cycle, antenna, site]

data:
  authority: interception-consent     # consent, or a statutory power
  holder: data-controller
  capture: [control-link, telemetry, video]
  retention: [period, storage, recipients]

"The control link is unauthenticated" is a compliance finding as well as a technical one: the same absence of authentication is what makes an unsolicited command into a third party's aircraft a criminal act rather than a research result.

The mitigation is not always a firmware change. Where the defect sits in a link that cannot be patched, the honest recommendation is often procurement (a different airframe or data link) or airspace: fly the mission where the consequence of failure is contained, and write that into procedure. A finding whose only remedy is a patch that does not exist is one the client will accept and ignore.

Evidence to Capture

Each permission is evidence in its own right, and the limits inside it are what a reviewer tests the work against. Capture the documents as issued, not a summary of them.

Flight permission: The instrument, its holder, the airframe and registration it names, and the volume, ceiling and time window it permits.

Radio authorisation: Centre frequency, bandwidth, power, duty cycle, antenna and site, together with the licensee the test operates under.

Data authorisation: Which links may be captured, the retention period, the storage location, the recipients, and the party whose consent is recorded.

Airspace constraint: The boundary that applied and whether it came from the authority published for that volume or from the manufacturer geofence in the ground station.

Equipment status: Airframe and critical-component make and model for each aircraft in scope, recorded against the equipment listing that governs import and sale in that market.

Transmission log: Frequency, power and duration actually used in each transmitting test, so the work can be compared with the authorisation rather than with the plan.

Authorisation Checklist

Flight

  • ☐ Instrument identified and read in full, not summarised
  • ☐ Airframe, registration and broadcast identity match the document
  • ☐ Volume, ceiling and time window recorded before launch
  • ☐ Operator and remote pilot named, with their separate duties
  • ☐ Waiver or exemption referenced where a limit is exceeded

Spectrum

  • ☐ Bands, power and duty cycle written into the test plan
  • ☐ Licensee identified and its conditions read
  • ☐ Antenna and site recorded, including height
  • ☐ Range licence checked for whether it covers transmission at all
  • ☐ Emission measured against the authorisation, not assumed

Data and equipment

  • ☐ Capture scope agreed per link, not per engagement
  • ☐ Retention period and recipients recorded
  • ☐ Consenting party identified and distinguished from the site owner
  • ☐ Fleet and spare components checked against the applicable listing
  • ☐ Procurement dependencies noted where a mitigation requires new hardware

Remediation

Operating within the instruments

  • • Hold the radio authorisation separately from the flight permission, and refuse any transmitting test that has only the second.
  • • Record the emission actually used in each test: frequency, power, duty cycle and antenna. A log that matches the authorisation is the evidence that the test was lawful.
  • • Attribute findings to the operator or to the remote pilot, since the fix differs: a procedure for one, a flight discipline for the other.
  • • Treat a manufacturer geofence as configuration, not as the legal boundary, and test whether the two agree before relying on either.

Design and procurement

  • • Prefer links with authenticated command and encrypted telemetry, so the interception and injection questions are answered by design rather than by authorisation.
  • • Check equipment authorisation status at purchase and again at spares order; component-level coverage reaches airframes assembled elsewhere.
  • • Keep a fleet inventory that names critical components, so a listing change can be mapped onto aircraft in service without a teardown.
  • • Offer airspace and procurement mitigations where the defect cannot be patched, and say plainly when the remedy lies outside the engagement.