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Complete Guide
Intermediate

Secure AI Development

This section is about the machine a developer writes code on, and the assistant that now runs there. It covers what an organisation can enforce on an endpoint it manages, what it can only observe once an assistant was installed by an individual, and which settings decide what reaches the model and what comes back with the authority to act.

The controls sit around the model, not inside it

Nothing on these pages is a prompt. A model cannot be configured into behaving, and a refusal is a probability rather than a boundary. Every control here is a decision made by software the organisation owns or contracts: which paths an assistant may read, whether a command needs approval, which servers are permitted, and what a merge requires.

What this section covers

The threat model sets out why an editor with an assistant is a boundary at all, and which control sits between untrusted repository text and an executed command. The four pages after it are the stack: the editor's policy surface, how that policy reaches a device, the repository platform that governs AI features and the merge gate, and the assistants no central policy reaches. The last page is the operating model.

The control stack

Each layer can enforce something the layers above it cannot, and each has a documented limit.

Layer What can be enforced there Page
Device policy Which editor build is present, whether extensions may install, and the telemetry level. 03 — GPO and Intune
Editor policy Updates, the marketplace, AI feature switches, permitted MCP servers, and the default approval mode. 02 — VS Code as an endpoint
Assistant configuration Per-assistant config files, permission rules that survive a saved approval, and the model provider it talks to. 05 — OpenCode and IDEs
Repository platform Which AI features are enabled, secret scanning and push protection, and the ruleset that decides what may merge. 04 — GitHub Enterprise
Pipeline Which workflow files may run, what token a job receives, and what a required check verifies. 04 — GitHub Enterprise
Identity, network and data Who may sign in from what device, which model endpoints are reachable, and what data controls sit on the endpoint. 05 — OpenCode and IDEs

Read it as an order of preference and a statement of dependency, not a checklist. Device policy cannot repair a merge gate that accepts anything, and a ruleset cannot stop a secret being pasted into a chat window. Where the first three rows do not exist, because the assistant is an individual's choice of tool, the last row is what remains.

What this section does not cover

  • Model training security, model internals, and the evaluation of a model's own behaviour.
  • Prompt engineering, and prompt-level defences presented as a substitute for an approval gate.
  • Attacks on AI-enabled systems and the payloads for them. Those are in Offensive AI, and this section links to them instead of repeating them.
  • Hardening of hosted AI services and their APIs, which belong to Cloud Pentesting and API Security.
  • Legal advice on vendor terms. These pages say which page of a provider's documentation answers a question, not what it will say when you read it.
  • Any claim that a control here satisfies a named framework requirement. The mapping is to an outcome you can demonstrate, not an attestation.